MERICS Forum: Transatlantic coordination on China under Trump

The profound shift in US foreign policy just days after President Donald Trump took office will significantly alter transatlantic coordination on China. His unilateral, transactional approach contrasts with Europe’s commitment to rules and multilateralism, though both face similar challenges from Beijing and stand to gain from enhanced cooperation.

In this edition of MERICS Forum, we look at what this means for EU-US coordination on China. Grzegorz Stec, Head of MERICS’ Brussels Office, asked leading experts: “What could effective transatlantic coordination on China look like under Trump’s presidency?” Grzegorz also offers his own take.

Donald Trump and his administration see China as the most consequential long-term rival to America’s security, prosperity, and global influence. Europeans are greatly concerned by China’s assertive posture on the continent. Approaches to managing relations with Beijing on the other hand differ greatly. President Trump has used a language of confrontation; Europeans prefer calculated engagement and managed competition. Yet the US and Europe share an interest in jointly leveraging their power to counter threats raised by the PRC, for example on:

• Security: strengthen NATO, invest in defense industrial capacity to counter China’s collaboration with Russia, Iran, and North Korea, pressure China to limit support for Russia’s war in Ukraine, and support negotiations.
• Geoeconomics: implement export controls on critical technologies, restrict outbound and monitor inbound investment, harmonize measures to counter Chinese industrial overcapacity, and protect domestic industries.
• Supply chains: limit dependencies and increase supply chain resilience for critical raw materials (manufacturing, industrial, and pharmaceutical).
  Technology: establish common standards for new technologies and fund coordinated research and innovation ventures.

So far, however, Trump has focused his coercive efforts mostly on US neighbors and allies. He has announced tariffs of 25 percent on Mexico and Canada and threatened as yet unspecified tariffs for Taiwan and the EU; he has stated that he wants to acquire Greenland, the Panama Canal, and Canada. But for China, he imposed tariffs of only ten percent and forestalled the shutdown of TikTok, inviting its CEO to the Inauguration. Might Trump yet turn out to be the “least anti-China politician” after all? And where does that leave Europe?

With the inauguration of President Donald Trump, transatlantic relations have entered a period of uncertainty. While Trump’s team is likely to attach less importance to cooperation with Europe than the Biden administration, there are still some areas where coordination will be potentially beneficial for both sides. China, which both the US and Europe see as a serious and growing challenge to their interests, presents opportunities for transatlantic alignment. Joint efforts to ramp up pressure on China to curb its support for Russia’s military-industrial complex could help Trump to achieve one of his priority objectives: ending the war in Ukraine. This should include secondary sanctions on Chinese financial institutions that assist Russia in evading EU sanctions and measures against large Chinese firms that have interests in both Europe and Russia.

Trump is keen to avoid entanglement in a military conflict and would welcome greater contributions by Europe to strengthen deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Europe has a huge stake in preserving Taiwan Strait peace and stability. It can therefore justify upping its game to persuade Xi Jinping that taking Taiwan by force would unleash a joint transatlantic response that would render his Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation unattainable. Europe should identify levers it can pull in the event of such an attack and work with the US to reduce shared vulnerabilities to potential Chinese retaliation in areas such as critical minerals.

There is much to be gained by enhancing US-European cooperation on existing and emerging security challenges. And if the US and Europe do not effectively coordinate on policy toward China, Beijing will undoubtedly exploit the gaps in their approaches to its own advantage.

How the United States and Europe deal with the China over the coming years will be central to the future of the transatlantic alliance and the global order. 

The China challenge is real, it is systemic, and there are genuine challenges we face. How will we address China’s predatory economic policies crushing our core manufacturing sectors? How do we sever its sustainment of Putin's war on Ukraine and the most significant conflict in Europe since World War II? And how can we ensure that transformational technologies like artificial general intelligence uphold individual liberty, rather than embody "Xi Jinping Thought"?

Instead of specific steps, I propose key principles to guide a transatlantic approach on China:

1. What unites us outweighs what divides us. Let’s agree the nuances of democratic governance differ across the Atlantic, and this is pretty normal.  But let’s also agree that the Chinese Communist Party's ideology is diametrically opposed to ours.
2. Shared responsibility means shared burden. The status quo ante of the post-Cold War era is over. The United States can act alone if we need to, but the president wants allies and partners to step up and contribute their fair share toward our interests and responsibilities.
3. Embrace disruption. We are in an era of disruption. Trump is a disruptor who is both a cause and a symptom of the global changes underway. Europe should work with him on novel ideas to make both the US and Europe stronger, more prosperous, and safer together. Because the alternative will be worse for us both.
4. Come with solutions, not problems. Focus on outcomes, not process. And both sides should be careful with rhetoric that can make it harder to find a mutually beneficial approach.

Under Trump 2.0, transatlantic coordination on China is possible, but it will be more difficult than ever. This stems not only from the fact that Trump's views on China are more confrontational than Europe's. The additional challenge is that the new administration will be very different from Trump 1.0. The idea of purging the supposed "deep state" and surrounding the president with trusted people who have (almost) no government experience and executives from the business community (which often depends on China) means there will be less predictability and likely tensions between the president and the business community.

This would create both opportunities and risks for transatlantic coordination. Neither the EU nor American business wants to decouple from China. American business– one of Trump's trusted acolytes, could help soften his stance and open the door for cooperation with Europe. If this approach prevails, the EU's much tougher policy on China could be an asset for Washington, and the prospects for transatlantic coordination would be more promising. However, if Trump decides to impose 60% tariffs on Chinese imports, which would effectively mean an immediate decoupling, the scope for transatlantic coordination would be extremely limited, if not non-existent, given that Chinese exports would almost certainly be redirected to Europe.

The only way forward for Europe is to prepare for both scenarios. The EU should keep a close eye on signs from the Trump administration and react flexibly. Based on Trump's business approach, the EU should first reduce the trade deficit with the US by buying more US LNG and military equipment. Second, the EU's already sharpened China policy should be presented as a hawkish big step forward. Narrative is sometimes more important than action. This could work with Trump. Third, it is worth using the existing EU-US Trade and Technology Council as the main venue for transatlantic coordination. The EU could present the TTC as an anti-China instrument, focusing on the most pressing issues that overlap perfectly with the US, such as high tech and AI.

Donald Trump’s return to the White House complicates transatlantic coordination on China, especially with the EU, in both process and substance. 

Trump’s more centralized, transactional, and personalized approach favors bilateral dealings with member states. Meanwhile, his preference for unilateral measures and withdrawal from a range of initiatives (e.g., the Paris Agreement, WHO, development aid financing, international taxation, or tackling disinformation) narrows the scope for transatlantic coordination.

Despite differences, both sides share a strategic interest in managing China-related challenges. Ultimately, no single player can address them alone.

For effective transatlantic coordination on China, Europe should:

• Take a deep breath: Understanding Trump’s tangible China agenda and whether it actually turns out as hawkish as previously expected is crucial. His administration’s follow-up to fentanyl-related tariffs and reaction to the emergence of Chinese AI rival DeepSeek will offer some initial insights on the reality of the US strategy.
• Refocus the agenda: In any case, Trump’s China policy won’t be about principles of the rules-based order. Cooperation should center on achieving very specific goals through coordinated actions. Drawing on the EU-US Trade and Technology Council’s experience, such a focus on fewer, but concrete, deliverables may have better results.
• Stay engaged: Maintaining robust dialogue at the working level – where there understanding for the need to cooperate with the EU will most likely be higher than in the White House – will be essential. With time, the points made by working-level colleagues can go up the decision-making ladder.
• Set a positive tone: Focus on achieving fast progress on selected China-linked issues of common interest that are less contested and dear to the Trump administration. For instance, work jointly on a coordinated approach to ICT trustworthiness certification or launch a discussion on coordinated R&D investment in military tech capabilities to showcase that transatlantic coordination on China can be a useful tool.
• Rally around the EU flag: Trump (and Beijing) will exploit divisions among member states, as a united EU has stronger bargaining power. Europe needs to demonstrate resolve to act together in face of pressures from Trump but also hammer home the message that a united Europe can make for a more useful transatlantic partner for Washington.

All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this MERICS Forum should be understood to be solely those of the authors.

This MERICS Forum is part of the “Dealing with a Resurgent China” (DWARC) project, which has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 101061700. 

Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.